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Age assurance as digital infrastructure

Read time: 7 minutes


For years, the online age gate was a speed bump: a tick box and a business that moved on. That model is ending.

No longer limited to pornography, gambling or other age-restricted content, age assurance is increasingly used to determine how digital services operate when children are present. Across Europe and beyond, policymakers now expect digital services to know, with demonstrable confidence, whether a user is a child and to design their services accordingly. For online service providers, age assurance is rapidly becoming one of the defining operational challenges of the digital content economy.

Child looking at a screen

For years, the online age gate was a speed bump: a tick box and a business that moved on. That model is ending.

No longer limited to pornography, gambling or other age-restricted content, age assurance is increasingly used to determine how digital services operate when children are present. Across Europe and beyond, policymakers now expect digital services to know, with demonstrable confidence, whether a user is a child and to design their services accordingly. For online service providers, age assurance is rapidly becoming one of the defining operational challenges of the digital content economy.

Market shift: age becomes a product parameter

Regulators increasingly expect platforms not merely to identify children, but to operate differently when children are present. That shift is significant. Age now affects account creation, recommendation systems, targeted advertising, direct messaging, livestreaming features, in-app purchases, AI-powered functionality and parental controls. What was once a gate at the edge of the service is becoming part of the service architecture itself. The practical consequence is that platforms must move towards age-segmented experiences. Different users may receive different default settings, product features or content recommendations depending on age. As a result, age assurance is no longer simply an access-control mechanism. It is becoming the trigger for a growing range of product obligations.

The age-assurance toolkit: verification, estimation and self-declaration

In practice, age assurance encompasses several distinct approaches, including self-declaration, age estimation and age verification.

Method
What it does
Strengths
Limits
Self-declaration
User states an age/date of birth, without evidence
0.99% Low friction; minimal data
Weak protection against misstatement (trivially circumvented)
Age estimation
Infers a likely age/age range from facial analysis, voice, behavioral or contextual signals
Relatively low-friction and privacy-preserving if data are promptly deleted
Probabilistic; error rates, bias and biometric-data concerns require careful governance
Age verification
Confirms age against hard identifiers or verified sources
Stronger assurance; compatible with selective disclosure
More intrusive; depends on credential availability, inclusion and user trust

Self-declaration alone appears to be falling out of favor across jurisdictions with regulators expecting tech companies to take more of an active step in establishing the age of its users. The debate has shifted focus toward whether estimation or verification is proportionate for a particular use case.

A converging objective, but fragmented rules

Within the EU, several regulatory frameworks are driving demand for stronger age assurance. Under the DSA, platforms accessible to minors must ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for children, and the European Commission’s Guidelines on the protection of minors pursuant to Article 28 DSA treat effective age assurance as a key risk-mitigation measure. The Guidelines take a risk-based approach: age restrictions and supporting age-assurance measures should be used only where they are appropriate and proportionate to the risks identified. For the highest-risk services, age verification is the benchmark; although age estimation may serve as an interim alternative where effective privacy-preserving verification is not yet readily available. The GDPR adds an important constraint: age assurance itself must remain proportionate and privacy-preserving. The EDPB, in its Statement 1/2025 on Age Assurance, has repeatedly emphasized that age checks should not become a proxy for identity verification and should collect only the information necessary for the relevant purpose.

Girl wearing headphones

At the same time, the European debate is expanding beyond age verification itself. The recently proposed KIDS Act would move further toward a safety-by-design model, requiring social media, gaming, app-store and AI-chatbot providers to adapt functionalities, default settings and user experiences according to users’ age. In doing so, it reinforces a broader trend: age assurance is increasingly becoming the mechanism through which product obligations are triggered.

Yet, Member States continue to pursue their own approaches. France provides a good example. After constitutional and EU-law challenges to earlier social media ban proposals, including concerns about requiring age assurance without identifying a clear and proportionate method for its implementation, policymakers have continued to explore age-based restrictions for certain online services through revised legislative models. Notably, the latest French proposal includes a sunset clause designed to step aside once an EU-wide social media ban for minors becomes applicable, illustrating both the push towards harmonization and the persistence of national experimentation. The UK’s Online Safety Act framework relies on the standard of “highly effective age assurance” (referring to measures that are technically accurate, robust, reliable and fair) for user-to-user and search services which may expose children to primary priority content that is harmful to children (e.g., pornographic content or content promoting self-injury, suicide or eating disorders etc.). The UK regulator in this space, Ofcom, has recently conducted a rapid assessment of what highly effective age assurance might look like in the context of the UK’s proposed under 16 social media ban. In the assessment Ofcom segmented its commentary to identify methods such as photo-ID matching, facial age estimation, open-banking checks and digital identity services, which it deems capable of identifying 16-year-olds; whereas credit card verification, mobile network operator checks and email estimation are only seen as effective for age assurance of 18-year-olds and over. Ofcom has already made it clear that passive age inference, currently deployed by several social media sites and apps, will not meet the standard of “highly effective” unless there is reliable and compelling evidence to the contrary. Following Ofcom’s first statutory report on content harmful to children online, which found that there had been no significant change in the proportion of children encountering harmful content over the first nine months of children’s safety duties being in force, it is likely that enforcement against platforms’ deploying ineffective age assurance gateways following the ban, will be more stringent than before.

Age now affects account creation, recommendation systems, targeted advertising, direct messaging, livestreaming features, in-app purchases, AI-powered functionality and parental controls.

Beyond Europe, Asia-Pacific offers two contrasting models. Australia has introduced a minimum age of 16 for accounts on certain social media platforms. Since December 10, 2025, Part 4A of the Online Safety Act 2021 has required age-restricted social media platforms to take reasonable steps to prevent users under 16 in Australia from creating or retaining accounts. The obligation falls on platforms rather than children or parents. eSafety’s regulatory guidance does not prescribe a particular age assurance method. Instead, it encourages platforms to adopt a layered approach, combining methods such as age inference from existing account data, age estimation and age verification. Platforms cannot require government-issued identification as the sole means of age assurance and must offer reasonable alternatives. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner co-regulates the privacy aspects of the scheme. Following amendments passed by Parliament on September 10, 2026, platforms that fail to take reasonable steps may face court-imposed penalties of up to AUD 109.2 million, equivalent to 300,000 penalty units for a body corporate. Age assurance requirements have also extended beyond social media. Under industry codes registered pursuant to the Online Safety Act, requirements for search engine services and app distribution services took effect on June 27, 2026 and September 9, 2026, respectively. China takes a more identity-focused approach. The Regulations on the Protection of Minors Online, in force since January 1, 2024, require providers of services such as information publishing and instant messaging to request minors’ true identity information from the minors or their guardians. Online game providers must also verify minors’ identities through necessary measures, including the unified electronic identity authentication system for minors’ online games. The draft State Council Provisions on Safeguarding Minors’ Healthy and Safe Use of the Internet released in September 2026 would introduce further requirements if promulgated. Network service providers would need to be capable of identifying minor users through methods including legal identity documents, national online identity authentication public services, one-time facial verification without data storage and behavioral recognition. The draft would also require certain services for users under 16, including social networking and AI services that may affect minors’ cognition, to be provided only through minors’ mode. It also requires measures to protect minors’ personal information.

Businesses face overlapping and constantly evolving layers of regulation in which acceptable methods, assurance thresholds and evidentiary expectations may differ from one jurisdiction to another.

Operational impact: choosing the right level of assurance

For businesses, the challenge is to determine what level of assurance is appropriate in light of the risks presented by their service, the applicable regulatory expectations and the likely tolerance of users for friction. They must also decide whether to rely on public infrastructure, such as digital identity wallets and government-backed credentials, or on established private-sector solutions. Increasingly, they may need to offer several options at once. Policymakers favor approaches that are fair, avoiding exclusion and discrimination, while businesses face the commercial reality that cumbersome verification journeys can increase abandonment and drive users elsewhere. The most effective age-assurance strategies are therefore likely to combine several methods rather than rely on a single solution. For businesses, the opportunity also lies in preparation. Age assurance is no longer solely a trust-and-safety issue; it is increasingly a product, compliance and commercial decision that is expanding in scope and complexity.

Toward a European age-assurance infrastructure

Europe is currently the clearest test case for whether age assurance can evolve from a compliance obligation into shared digital infrastructure. Through an age-verification blueprint and an emerging Digital Identity Wallet ecosystem with zero-knowledge proofs, the EU is pursuing a privacy-preserving and harmonized strategy: enabling users to prove they meet a given age threshold without revealing their identity, repeating document checks or sharing unnecessary personal data. If successful, this approach could significantly reduce fragmentation within the EU and allow providers operating across multiple Member States to no longer navigate entirely different technical approaches in each market and instead rely on more interoperable proof-of-age mechanisms.

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Key takeaways

  1. Age assurance is no longer just about restricting access. It is becoming a mechanism through which platforms determine how products operate for different categories of users.
  2. Regulators broadly agree on the objective, but not yet on the method. A growing consensus exists around protecting minors online, yet significant differences remain regarding what constitutes sufficient age assurance and which technologies should be preferred.
Girl looking at a screen

Key takeaways

  1. Age assurance is no longer just about restricting access. It is becoming a mechanism through which platforms determine how products operate for different categories of users.
  2. Regulators broadly agree on the objective, but not yet on the method. A growing consensus exists around protecting minors online, yet significant differences remain regarding what constitutes sufficient age assurance and which technologies should be preferred.
Girl looking at a screen

Authors


Paula Barrett

Paula Barrett

Partner, Co-Lead of Global Cybersecurity and Data Privacy, UK

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Caroline Lyannaz

Caroline Lyannaz

Partner, Digital Content Sub-Sector Co-Lead, France

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Alby Yuen

Partner, Head of Technology & Digital, Asia

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Camille Lehuby

Camille Lehuby

Senior Associate, France

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Jonathan Palmer

Jonathan Palmer

Senior Associate, UK

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