Part Two: Practical implications of regulations on deal making
How regulatory change is impacting deals
Having reviewed the changes in the regulatory framework, we now turn to the impact of these on the execution of M&A transactions. One of the main effects of the changes discussed above is increased time to complete transactions. This triggers practical implications which in turn affect the way documentation is drafted and negotiated. The main take away for practitioners is that the issue of regulatory clearances, whatever their nature, must now be dealt with upfront. If a deal is likely to be prohibited or require remedies, parties need to assess the viability of the transaction as early as possible.
Hell or High Water clauses
Eversheds Sutherland partners are seeing more “hell or high water” clauses in transactions as a result of antitrust and FDI regimes capturing a broader range of deals.
More are now being included in deals than three years ago, according to our survey. Particularly with larger transactions. 36% of partners stated there had been at least an 11% increase in the proportion of deals where these are included. In a “hell or high water” clause a buyer agrees to “resolve any objections” to the deal raised by an antitrust regulator and “take all actions” required by such regulator. In other words, they provide that the buyer takes the antitrust risk. A true hell or high water provision (i.e. one that is unqualified) would mean that even if a regulator proposed a remedy that would adversely impact the buyer’s business, the buyer would be obliged to implement it in order to have the transaction approved. One difficulty with including a hell or high water provision is that it assumes that there are steps/actions that a buyer can take to resolve regulatory objections (structural or behavioural remedies), for example divestment of a particular division. As noted earlier in the report, the US appears to be eschewing remedies completely. As such in transactions where there is a US antitrust clearance required, a hell or high water clause would have no application. Hell or high water provisions will not work if a transaction is objected to in its entirety or if a buyer proposes remedies and they are rejected. In these cases the only satisfactory solution for authorities would be termination. If there is no resolution to antitrust or FDI issues, the seller may consider if a break fee could be paid to the buyer. Ultimately the parties need to agree who bears the risk if the transaction does not get clearance. The Seller will retain the target group business but should they also be compensated in some way? The results of our Eversheds Sutherland M&A Partners Survey show us that Hell or High Water clauses are included more often than break fee clauses or reverse break fee clauses.
The best solution is for both parties and their advisors to conduct a detailed analysis of potential remedies, considering what may be requested by each authority involved. This analysis should also consider the likelihood of remedies being imposed. This work will mean that the buyer will feel more assured that the transaction will be approved, and therefore more likely to agree to a hell or high water clause. If this isn’t possible, the discussion will turn to break fees. Parties are now spending more time and effort assessing antitrust and FDI risk at an earlier stage of transactions. This includes considering what remedies, if any, may be imposed. If done early, this work can inform parties’ discussions around hell or high water or break fees at the heads of terms stage. For sellers, this can inform bid assessments and provide greater certainty. For buyers, it mitigates transaction risk, whilst also front-loading the cost of an in-depth regulatory analysis, and minimizing the risk of withdrawing from a transaction at a later stage. Another option is for the parties to negotiate a ‘fix-it-first’ strategy. This is where the parties agree to divest assets or businesses that present competitive concerns to third parties before seeking antitrust approval for the proposed transaction. This strategy can be appealing as it could avoid lengthy and costly regulatory procedures, and also circumvent onerous restrictions that often accompany a divestment order issued by the authorities. However, a fix-it-first strategy is not without risk. For example, after months of negotiating with a third party divestiture buyer, an antitrust authority could deem the divestment insufficient to remedy the antitrust concerns and/or consider the divestiture buyer to be unqualified and unable to replicate the competitive status quo. The scope of hell or high water clauses is getting much broader as parties seek to cover potential remedies from multiple antitrust regimes and also FDI regulators. While a antitrust remedy might be to divest a part of the buyer’s business, the remedy for FDI consent might be, for example, meeting certain information security requirements or governance controls. The buyer will need to consider what remedies it is willing to give and whether, for example, it is willing to litigate if the remedies imposed by a regulator are not acceptable. This is particularly relevant in respect of FDI remedies where they may impose continuing obligations on the buyer that restrict them throughout their entire period of ownership. With gaps getting longer, parties also face the difficulty of growing, or even maintaining, the commercial value of the business during the gap period. During the gap, hell or high water provisions address if a buyer should be restricted from acquiring any other businesses which could impact transaction approvals. This might not be a concern with a three or four month gap, but where they extend to 12, or even 18 months, it does become a consideration.
MAC Clauses
Where there is a material gap in transactions between signing and closing, there is likely to be a method that will mitigate the risk for both the buyer and the seller. That may be by way of a termination right, a material adverse change or “MAC” clause or by the ability to claim for a breach of warranty or gap covenant. MAC clauses offer buyers protection between signing and closing, where there is an event, development, or change that is materially adverse to the target business, or its financial condition. This is usually subject to heavily negotiated carve-outs around industry-wide factors and events, including acts of God and pandemics. Operation of a MAC typically allows a buyer to either terminate their agreement to purchase the target, or obtain a price reduction. In the traditional sense, MAC clauses are drafted broadly so that a “material adverse change” in the target triggers a termination right. This is far more common in the US than in Europe. In reality, a split exchange and close scenario in the UK or Europe, particularly where the gap is material, will be some kind of right to terminate. For example, for a material breach of warranty. Alternatively, there may be a more tightly drafted MAC where a buyer could, for example, terminate if a key customer is lost, or if there is an event that leads to an adverse impact of revenue of a certain percentage. There is always a lot of attention on the drafting of MAC clauses. Buyers aim to make them as broad as possible, whilst sellers want them to be narrow. As gaps become longer, scrutiny over this has only increased. In the UK it is very difficult for bidders to invoke a MAC in order to terminate a public company deal. There is a very high materiality threshold that must be satisfied in order for a bidder to be permitted to lapse an offer once it has been announced and in both leading cases regarding MAC the Takeover Panel found that the threshold had not been met.
Even in the US where MAC clauses are more common it remains uncommon for a MAC clause to be invoked as a justification for deal termination. More often it is used as a basis for renegotiation. There have been a number of cases in the Delaware courts regarding MAC clauses which have established the challenges in enforcing a MAC clause to terminate a transaction. The burden of proving that there has been a MAC is a heavy one. Drafting of such clauses is interpreted narrowly by the courts. In fact, the Delaware courts have found that a standard MAC occurred in only one case, and the facts of that case were extreme. There have been fewer cases in the English courts as to interpretation of MAC but the cases that there have been suggest that English courts may adopt the Delaware approach. The more specific the MAC trigger and any materially threshold, the better likelihood of being able to enforce a MAC. As we have mentioned the value of a MAC to a buyer becomes more important where there is a longer gap period even if only used as leverage to enable a buyer to reopen pricing discussions. MACs seek to address the economic risk that the value of the business is adversely impacted between signing and closing. This economic risk is proportionately greater the longer the period of any gap. We have seen some creative structures agreed upon which seek to address the risk of a long gap period such as passing net economic benefit of the target group from the seller to buyer in the gap period. While this does not alter the downside risk for the buyer of the value of the target business being adversely impacted in the gap, in this structure, which was admittedly bespoke, there is some risk mitigation by way of the buyer obtaining the profits of the business during the gap.
Termination rights
MAC clauses are still relatively uncommon. We are, however, seeing a broader range termination rights in transactions as a result of longer gap periods. For example, a buyer might look to obtain a termination right for breach of warranties during the gap, or there may be a specific event, such as the loss of a customer particularly significant to business revenue. We are also seeing material breach of gap control covenants being discussed as a termination right. Where gap periods are materially extended, gap controls become more of a focus for both parties. While it might be difficult to determine what a buyer’s loss would be as a result of breach of a material gap control, such a termination right can give the buyer the leverage to seek to renegotiate price.
In addition the buyer may feel more comfortable with a termination right for breach of gap controls where the buyer is relying on gap controls to restrict the seller from activities that could adversely impact regulatory processes and timetables, for example the expansion to another territory or an acquisition. Where this is the case a buyer might seek additional protection from the seller by way of indemnification.
Long-stop dates are getting longer
In order to anticipate regulatory interventions, long stop dates are now longer, according to our partners. Whilst long-stop dates in M&A agreements are typically six months in duration, 21% of our Eversheds Sutherland M&A Partners Survey respondents stated that they now average one year and at least one partner had recently seen a long stop date of 18 months.
Most partners did not consider that the length of long stop dates depend on deal size, or the sector involved. Half of them believe that long stop dates are becoming longer in order to anticipate any regulatory intervention.
This is unsurprising given our analysis regarding the changing regulatory environment globally. The increased reach and complexity of antitrust and FDI regimes, which are increasingly sector agnostic and which do not necessarily correlate to deal size, means clearance timelines can extend for significant periods. We are seeing increased scrutiny and longer investigations. Whilst many of these have statutory deadlines by which they have to provide responses, some can delay the commencement of the statutory decision period until the relevant authority deems the application complete. Alternatively, they can ‘stop the clock’ each time they request further information, or can decide they need more time to assess a deal or consider remedies. All of this means it can be difficult to gain clarity on timing expectations. As a result, long stop dates are needed to ensure the transaction does not prematurely terminate if an expected clearance has not been obtained in time. If an extended long-stop date is expected and the parties are discussing transitional services that will apply for a period post-closing, consider whether the parties are able to take any steps in the gap period to resolve the need for post-closing transitional arrangements. For example, if the seller should be obliged to progress arrangements to complete any carve-out, or should the buyer have to ready their systems or undertake necessary expenditure in order that the need for transitional services falls away. The reality is that neither party is likely to be willing to expend significant amounts of money or re-organize its group if they do not have certainty that a transaction will become unconditional. To the extent the parties do agree to undertake any steps, they must be mindful of antitrust requirements and have a clear understanding of who will bear the cost of such steps. The appropriate long stop date for your transaction will be determined by a number of factors including the relevant regulatory conditions, the cost of keeping financing available for the duration and the bargaining power of the parties (for example, in a competitive auction, a shorter long stop date is likely to be sought by the seller). Seeking guidance from advisors who have been through the relevant regulatory processes means you can leverage their experience to anticipate likely timeframes.
Conduct of business between signing and closing
Where a regulatory approval is a required condition to closing, there will be a gap between when the transaction document(s) are signed (at which point the buyer becomes bound to complete the transaction, subject to the conditions being satisfied and any available termination rights not being utilised) and when the transaction completes (at which point the buyer becomes the controller of the relevant company/asset). During this period, known as the ‘interim period’ or the ‘gap period’, management and control of the target will remain with the seller(s). In such a situation a buyer will want to include appropriate contractual safeguards in the transaction documentation (known as ‘interim covenants’ or ‘gap protections’) to require the seller(s) to carry on the business of the target in the ordinary course and to ensure that no material decisions are taken without the buyer’s prior approval. This desire for control is heightened when the period between signing and closing is longer. Otherwise the business the buyer agreed to purchase could be very different by the time the transaction completes. However, this has to be balanced both with the reality of increased scrutiny by antitrust authorities in to parties’ pre-closing conduct, and the need to minimize disruption to the target business during what could be a lengthy process, possibly extended beyond a full accounting period. The buyer’s oversight and control of the business it has agreed to purchase has to be assessed against the consequential interference with the day-to-day running of the business that such oversight can create. The negotiation of interim covenants becomes more difficult where long-stop periods are extended, particularly where they are extended over an accounting period. It is important to consider what rights a buyer may expect in relation to the target’s budget or accounts, where these are drawn up in the gap period. This may include a right to review, a consent right, or a right of access to key individuals. What can be requested could be influenced by a number of factors. These include the length of the gap period, as the longer the period, the more control may be expected by a buyer. Other factors include antitrust sensitivities and other remedies the buyer has been able to negotiate in case the target substantially changes prior to closing, such as material adverse change protections and termination rights discussed. The appropriate long-stop date for your transaction will be determined by a number of factors. These include the relevant regulatory conditions, the cost of finance availability for the duration of the transaction, and the bargaining power of the parties such as within a competitive auction, where the seller is likely to want a shorter long-stop date. Seeking guidance from advisors who have been through the relevant regulatory processes means you can leverage their experience to anticipate likely time frames.
For example, consider if the seller should be obliged to progress arrangements to complete any carve-out, or whether the buyer should ready its systems or undertake necessary expenditure to avoid the need for transitional services. Also consider whether a right to review or a right of access to key individuals should be requested. Note that what can reasonably be requested will be influenced by the length of the gap period (the longer the period the more control may be expected by a buyer), antitrust sensitivities and what other remedies the buyer has been able to negotiate in case the target substantially changes prior to closing (such as MAC protections and termination rights discussed above). In a similar vein, ordinary course of business carve-outs on which sellers will often rely to ensure that they can continue to run the business as they have done become problematic for buyers. A buyer may not want the seller(s) entering into new contracts in the gap even if they are in the ordinary course. This might be the same for annual salary increases, or material senior hires. Parties may also need to agree the approach to take in respect of tendering against each other for bids in the gap period. These are considerations in any gap protections negotiation however they become more significant for the parties and the target where there is a long gap. When considering interim covenants, it is important to remember that most mandatory antitrust regimes around the world will prohibit a transaction from being completed (or otherwise put into effect) prior to receipt of the relevant clearance. Such activity is known as ‘gunjumping’ and significant fines have been placed on companies that have been considered to have implemented a merger prior to clearance. In the eyes of the antitrust authorities, the parties are expected to continue to operate as independent businesses prior to clearance and to maintain the pre-signing status quo as between the parties in case the transaction is prohibited or conditions are attached to the clearance. This is particularly true where the parties are competitors given the greater risk of deals being prohibited as a result of horizontal concerns as noted previously. However, this scrutiny can raise practical issues for parties subject to a conditional transaction who will be looking to plan for closing and post-closing integration as soon as possible. Some suggested steps to bridge this gap include avoiding the exchange of potentially sensitive information or, if it is necessary to share such information in order to prepare for closing, sharing such competitively sensitive information under a clean team protocol. This sets out agreed rules of review. Some of these are that only members of respective parties who are not involved in commercial decision-making can see the information, and that competitively sensitive data, such as pricing and margins, can only be shared more widely if such information is aggregated. Other examples include instances where information is shared between legal counsel only. In these situations, it is best to work with your advisors to assess and navigate potential issues that may arise, and to discuss practical steps to resolve them.
Impact on Warranty and Indemnity Insurance coverage
Across the globe we are seeing a greater use of warranty and indemnity insurance (‘W&I insurance’ also known as ‘representations and warranties insurance’ or ‘RWI’) in M&A transactions of all shapes and sizes as the underwriting market in this area matures and expands. W&I insurance has been effectively used for years to, among other things, streamline negotiation between the parties, provide the seller with a ‘clean exit’ and avoid post-closing conflict for the parties. However, we are aware that the greater complexity created by a longer gap between signing and closing is feeding into the W&I insurance workstream of transactions as well. The impact of a longer gap on W&I insurance coverage depends on the warranties being repeated and the length of the gap. Fundamental warranties will not require a bring down in disclosure given they cannot be disclosed against, nor will a short gap (of a few weeks) in most cases. However, where the warranties being repeated include general or tax warranties, most underwriters will require updated disclosures to be provided at closing. This raises the question of what happens if a new issue is disclosed at or prior to closing that could give rise to a warranty claim. As a general rule of thumb (and subject to the terms and conditions and exclusions of the particular policy):
- Where an issue is disclosed in the gap period that qualifies the signing warranties (i.e. the warranty breach arose prior to signing but it was only discovered by the buyer after signing and prior to closing), the W&I insurance policy is likely to cover this as a breach of a signing warranty.
- Where an issue disclosed in the gap period would only qualify the closing warranties (i.e. the warranty breach both (i) arose and (ii) was discovered by the buyer after signing and prior to closing), this is not likely to be covered by W&I insurance given it is a known risk at the time the closing warranties are given. Some insurers do, however, offer policy enhancements such as new breach cover for an additional premium which would respond in such a situation (provided the relevant endorsement had been obtained prior to the breach becoming known by the buyer).
- For completeness, where the buyer obtains actual knowledge of a breach that occurred during the interim period after closing (i.e. the warranty breach arose prior to closing but the buyer only obtained actual knowledge of it after closing), this will be covered by the policy as a breach of a closing warranty.
You should work with your advisers to ensure you fully understand your coverage position prior to agreeing the policy and, ideally, prior to signing the transaction documents, so that you can negotiate (or resist) any additional protections as against the other party should the W&I insurance policy fail to respond. Extending the gap between signing and completion can change the conversation, since the risk of a breach increases the longer the gap period. If buyers are concerned about the risk of a breach being discovered, that is not covered by W&I insurance, or if the parties agree to return to the negotiating table upon an uninsured breach being discovered, it is likely a buyer will request some coverage from sellers, depending on the bargaining positions of both parties. This may be a price chip, a termination right, or a right to claim against the seller for breach of warranty during the gap. All of this prejudices the nil recourse a seller will have expected, and may materially alter their commercial outcome. There is a separate practical question around whether parties can actually obtain W&I insurance cover for the increasing lengths of time that deals are taking to complete. Where possible, it is worth raising any expectations on the length of any gap period upfront with your W&I insurance brokers. They can test capacity in the market at the non-binding indications stage to confirm which insurers are able to offer coverage for extended periods. However, to the extent the length of the gap period only becomes fully understood during underwriting (or the gap period extends further after signing the transaction), do discuss with your broker what the requirements of the underlying insurer will be in respect of such a period. Most insurers that we have experience with are able to cover nine month gap periods, and many can provide coverage for up to 12 months. We are aware of a smaller subset of insurers who can offer terms beyond 12 months. Insurers have been known to be willing to be creative in order to land a policy especially if it is a time of greater capacity in the industry. The key for the insurers is to understand whether anything has changed in the gap period. If the length of gap is particularly long, some insurers have a standard list of further underwriting questions they will ask in addition to any bring down disclosure exercise undertaken between the parties. These questions will likely focus on, among other matters, changes to the target and any changes to the transaction structure in the gap period. Understanding the expected conditionality and length of gap period for your transaction early in the transaction process will help to smooth this process and obtain the best levels of coverage.
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